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The
EFFECT CE HXR AST) PO.VER ON REPUBLIC!!! &BHS3RSHIP 1860-1870.
I
Introduction.
The history student is always confronted with a dif-
ficulty in putting himself "back into the spirit of the period
which he is studying. It is always troublesome to discard one's
pre judices , to get the viewpoint of the person living at the
time. This is particularly true in studying political history,
and more especially the political history of the years 1860 to
1870. Knowing the results, as we do, we are astonished to see that
the men of that day often failed to appreciate the very things
which we now consider their dearest heritage to us. To us,
Linco'ln looms up, out of the past, next to .'Washington himself .'
How, then , can we be expected to understand the opposition there
was to his renominate on in 1864* »7e inevitably think of Lincoln
when v/e think of freedom. Yet facts show that he regretted
having issued the "Emancipation Proclamation". For one who
wishes to study the materials out of which history is made, it
is well to remember, not that coming events cart their shadows
before, but that events csrt shadows behind them which are likely
to discolor the facts.
This article works with three factors - the Eepublican
Party, its political power, and the Civil ,var. Some phases of
their relationships or the reactions which they had, each on the
other,will be shown.
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II
The Forces Back of Lincoln's Nomination and Election
Not the least of the surprises of the year 1860, was
the nomination by the Chicago Convention of Abraham Lincoln as
the Presidential candidate. The exact way in which this Coup
d' etat was accomplished has received ample attention and need
not be given here. However, there are several things in con-
nection therewith which have not generally received' sufficient
attention. In the first place, when one-third of the Illinois
delegates expected to vote for him only as a compliment, 1 it
is difficult to see how the opportunity was taken up on the
spur of the minute with such great success. When Seward was
the supposedly accepted candidate, there must assuredly have
been some other driving force than his personal following back
of Lincoln's nomination. The widespread acceptance of a com-
paratively unknown man as leader must also be accounted for.
The whole affair can perhaps be best explained by the character
of the party in 1860 and the possibility of a Republican vic-
tory in that year.
At the time of the Chicago Convention there were in
the party three distinct elements. In the first place, there
was a rather large group of former Whigs who found themselves
without a party in the years before 1860. In the second place,
there were a number of moderate Democrats who had been alienated
1. White, The Life of Lyman Trumbull
, p. 102.
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from their party by what they considered the extreme position of
some of their leaders. Thirdly, there was a large group of lib-
eral and radical reformers. Down to 1860, at least, this last
element was the predominating group and the one which gave the
party its character and made its reputation.
During the period before 1860, "revolutionary radical-
ism pervaded all fields, in religion, politics, and morals."^
"The natural tendency was for all these various reforms to blend
together, from the fact that those who were radically inclined
in one direction were generally favorably disposed to reforms
in all others."^ "In fact the substantial unity of all re-
formers as radicals was the popular impression of the tirae."^
Men such as Greeley were interested not only in abolition of
slavery but in civil service reform, land reform, the brother-
hood of man, and the rights of labor in general. The same is
true of Julian, Giddings, Garrison, Lovejoy, and others. In
fact the various reformers were generally grouped under the
5heading of "the isms."
The Philadelphia Convention of 1856 had brot to-
gether all those reformers who were politically inclined. The
temporary chairman of the convention struck the key note when
he declared "they may say that we mean to concentrate and
gather under our wings all the odds and ends of parties - all
2. Smith, Poli t ical Parti e s and Slavery, p. 268.
3. Ibid, p. 270.
4. Ibid, p. 271.
5. Ibid, p. 270.
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the isms of the day. Let them come to us with all their isms."
°
By- the majority of these men the abolition of slavery was re-
garded simply as "the previous question, and as less abstract
7
and far more immediately important" than the others. But "the
abolition of the chattel slavery of the Southern negro was
simply the introduction and prelude to the emancipation of all
Q
races from all forms of servitude."
Some of the men who attended this convention did not
approve of its character and work. For instance, A. K. McClure,
a former Whig and later a prominent Republican, finding himself
out of a party at this time, attended the convention. But it was
too "wild and woolley in flavor" to suit him and his conserva-
9tive friends.
This radical reform character was quite generally
recognized. At this time, Henry A. Wise wrote to John W. Forney
"whether the peaceful state of revolution shall continue
depends upon the issue whether Black Republicanism is strong
enough to elect John C. Fremont, with all the demon isms at his
heels." 10 Undoubtedly the closeness of the popular vote that
year jarred many into seeing something more than the "wild and
woolley" character of the party. The possibilities were becoming
evident and caused no little attention. 11
6. Proceedings of the ITat'l. Rep. Con . Speech by Judge Emment.
7. Julian, Political Recollections
,
p". 325.
8. Ibid, pp. 322-3.
9. McClure, Our Pres idents, p. 136.
10. Garrison, Life of W. L. Garrison , Vol. 3, p. 435.
11. McClure, Our Presidents
, p. 137.
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"The persistent and emphatic statement "by the opposi-
tion that the Republicans were the radical party had fixed that
idea in the public mind." As such the reform group continued
to dominate the party. Carl Schurz in a letter in fifty-eight,
speaks of the control in the West "by the "radical wing" or as
13he preferred it, the "philosophical" wing of the party. This
reform reputation was very widespread. Even the "Saturday Review"
published in England, had this to say as late as I860, "Among
the various parties and sections of parties which the Republicans
have absorbed not the least important is the small band of ar-
dent, speculative politicians which has imbibed a tinge of
socialism."^ It is thus quite evident that there was a large
group in the Republican party before 1860 which was interested
not only in abolition of slavery, but in all the reform questions
of the day and that down to 1860 if it had not dominated the par-
ty it was reputed to have done so.
But, while the reform element had at the start been
the core around which other groups collected, by 1860 the Whig
and the Democratic members also constituted a large portion of
the party and what these two latter lacked in publicity they
made up for in astuteness and political experience.
Between 18 56 and 1860 the Whigs thruout the country
12. Rhodes, History o f United States
,
Vol. 2, p. 502.
13. Schurz, Writings, Vol. I, p. 35.
14. Saturday Review, Dec. 1, 1860. quoted in Living Age,
Jan. 19, 1861.
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saw the final collapse of their organizations. This left them
without party affiliations and it was necessary to find new
ones. To a large extent these came into the Republican Party.
McClure mentions that he and other conservative Whigs of Penn-
sylvania finally drifted into the party because of the Democratic
position on the slavery question; altho they did not favor the
Republican attitude either. He also mentions that some of the
more conservative Whigs preferred to and did join the Democrats.
*
Events between 1856 and 1860 tended likewise to
"alienate a large portion of the intelligent element of the
Democracy." 1^ Many of these such as the German elements in
the Northwest were more nearly akin to the original reform
group than the Y/higs had been.
There is one thing to note particularly about these
additions. For the most part they were not of the reform char-
acter. They sympathised with few of the questions such as
woman suffrage, rights of labor, etc., except the slavery ques-
tion; and in so far as they were against slavery, it was because
they could not tolerate the Democratic position than that they
favored the Republican position. By some of the Republicans
this was clearly recognized. Julian, for instance, points out
that "the position of the Free Soilers was radically different
(from the Republican YThigs and Democrats). They opposed
slavery upon principle, and irrespective of any compact or
15. LIcClure, Our Presi dents
, pp. 145-6.
16. Ibid, p. 154.
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compromise; and a.Itho they rejoiced at the popular condemna-
tion of the perfidy which had repealed it, they regarded it
17
as a false issue.
"
As may have "been expected, with the growing import-
ance of the party and the almost assured victory in 1860,
there was attracted to it many who were not at all interested
in the questions at stake "but who were rather there for the
possible spoils.
Such was the changing character of the elements of
the party. What effect did this growth have on the purposes
or principles and leadership of the party? In the first place,
they limited the purpose of the party to the slavery question
and that as the opposition to the latest outrage of the slave
18holders and not to the question of human rights. Between
1856 and 1860 the party "became gradually more and more under
the dominance of the conservative elements which were joining
the party.
In several of the states such as Indiana, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, there was a decided conscious effort to change the
purposes of the party. This was much resented by some of the
older Republicans. Julian in speaking of conditions in his
state said "border ruffian outrages and elaborate disclaimers
of abolitionism were the regular staple of our orators, who
openly declared that the Republican party was a. 'white man's
17. Julian, Politica l Recollections, p. 137.
18. Ibid, ^ ~ p. 167.

party. 1 Ant i- slavery speakers like Clay and Burlingame were
studiously kept out of southern Indiana, where the teachings
of Republicanism were especially needed. ""^ He likewise
speaks of it as having occurred again in fifty-eight. Speak-
ing of the situation in Congress, in fifty-nine, Giddings
said that the very men who had been elected on the avowal of
Republican principles urged their repudiation. Some men went
20
so far as to say the party had no principles. In accounting
for this situation, he sums up briefly the opinion of reform-
ers like himself. He said "Men who had long acted with the
Whig ppjrty, under the conviction that its policy and princi-
ples were correct, found themselves abandoned by their asso-
ciates with whom they had long acted and were constrained to
unite with Republicans or remain isolated from political so-
ciety. Coming into the Republican organization, they sought
to change the party with whom they united rather than admit
they had been vrrong in former times. Another class were office
seekers. They had opposed the Republican organization until
they saw its success was inevitable. They then joined it, .
And Julian adds that many of "the Democratic bolters" who came
22into the Republican party "were only half converted."
Thus down to the Chicago Convention the Republican
party was composed of three rather distinct elements all
19. Julian, Political Recollections
,
p. 167.
20. Giddings, History of the Rebellion
,
p. 430.
21. Ibid, p. 443.
22. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 153.
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6* y>*
partially united on one question. The radical reform group
gave the reputation and tone to the party but it was actually
decreasing in influence within the party. But it was still a
vital force. The leadership and dominance were gradually com-
ing under the control of former Whigs and Democrats who were (J
rather conservative. Every one in the party expected a presi-
dential victory in 1860.
11 Seward and Chase were its foremost men. Next to
them in rank were Sumner, Fessenden, Hale, Collamer, Wade,
Banks, and Sherman. Lincoln was not counted even in the second
23
rank until after the joint debates with Douglas." Seward
was the logical candidate and the generally expected one. In
fact, "two-thirds of all the delegates elected to that conven-
or
tion were friends of Seward and expected to vote for him."
But Seward's "irrepressible conflict" speech had been widely
heralded and the growing conservatism of the party re-acted
against him. The lea.ders would have found it hard to line up
the rank and file for him which did not go so far on the ques-
tion. "There were indispensable states which many people
believed Seward could not carry. In Pennsylvania, Indiana,
Hew Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, he was accounted
too radical for the temper of the electors." Even "Illinois
25
was reckoned doubtful." There was an undercurrent in the
23. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
,
p. 102.
24. llcClure, Our Presidents, p. 155.
25. White, Lif e of* Lyman Trumbull, p. 102.
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party among the conservative groups which sought a candidate
more acceptable to their electors. Various men were possibil-
ities "but were discarded for different reasons. "A conserva-
tive candidate of good repute and sufficiently well known to
the public, seemed to be the desideratum. "^° But the radical
element had to be kept in mind also by these manipulators.
Bates, who was considered a very good possibility by the con-
servatives had to be discarded because Koerner, "the most in-
fluential German in Illinois" advised "that Bates could not
27
command the German vote." In fact, after having made him-
selfacquainted with the contents of fifty German Republican
newspapers, Koerner found that, as first choice, they were
unanimous for either Seward or Fremont but would support Lincoln
?8
or Chase. How three of these it was thot could not be
elected if nominated. Lincoln, coming from one of the doubt-
ful states, comparatively unknown out of his state, character-
ized by VThig conservatism, was considered as a very good possi-
bility. The big question was how to secure his nomination.
From the start of the National Convention, Indiana was in favor
of Lincoln. After a complimentary vote to Cameron, Pennsylvania
supported him, too. This latter was not secured without cost,
because later Lincoln felt bound to give Cameron a place in the
cabinet due to the promises of his friends who had been in charge
of his nomination. The only real opponent in the balloting
26. "White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
, p. 103.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

-11-
was Seward, and as "between these two most of the conservative
votes were given to Lincoln. By the men concerned, Lincoln's
nomination was generally understood to have been a matter of
expediency. McClure.who was with the Pennsylvania delegation
and helped convert some of the Seward men to Lincoln, said that
they voted for him "not because they loved Seward less, but be-
cause they loved Republican success more." Greeley, who did
not himself favor Seward's nomination later, rather rhetor-
ically declared, "know, shallow pate .' that Lincoln was nom-
inated for the one sufficient reason that he could obtain more
electoral votes than any of his competitors. 1,30 Several years
later one of the Republican magazines, altho then opposed to
Seward, stated "Seward only failed to become President because
he was supposed to represent his party too faithfully to com-
mand the suffrages of certain doubtful states holding the bal-
31
ance of power.
But Lincoln's nomination was not without opposition.
There were certain elements who thot that by taking Lincoln the
original doctrines of the party were being thrown overboard,
and that it smacked too much of the former methods of treating
the slavery question, against which the formation of the Repub-
lican party had been a protest. "More than one-third of all
the delegates who voted for Lincoln in that convention did it
in sincere sorrow because compelled to abandon their great
29. LIcClure, Our Pre sidents, p. 156.
30. Greely, Es say on Lincoln
, p. 34.
31. The Nation, Sept. 20, 1866. p. 233.
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leader for the sake of victory. "^ One member who had been
associated with the party from the start said HKis nomination
had been secured through the diplomacy of conservative Repub-
licans, whose morbid dread of 'abolitionism' unfitted them
as I believed, for leadership in the battle with slavery which
had now become inevitable. 11 The agreement between the Lincoln
men and the delegates from Indiana and Pennsylvania whereby
Caleb B. Smith and Simon Cameron were to be given cabinet posi-
tions likewise met their condemnation. Others believed
Lincoln's "early training and habits of thought had led him
to believe the slaveholder had some or legal right to the ser-
vices of his slave; and although an eloquent advocate of lib-
erty, it appeared difficult for him to believe that the right •
of life and liberty had been bestowed on black men equal ly with
the white race." 34 Koerner in his "Memoirs" says that Mr.
Evarts and Carl Schurz were both deeply affected and did not
disguise their regret.
But all in all, while many of the radical groups were
opposed to Lincoln's nomination, they did not despair. Having
failed to get a candidate who measured up to their ideals on
the slavery question, they felt that their position was so
logical that he too must needs come to it shortly. Giddings,
who is generally reputed to have been one of the most radical
32. McClure, Our Pr e sidents
,
p. 157.
33. Julian, Political Recollec tions, p. 182.
34. Giddings, History of the Rebe llion , p. 445.
35. Koerner, Memoi rs , Vol. g
,
p. 91.
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of the Republicans, said, ""but from his (Lincoln's) candor,
his frankness, and integrity, the anti-slavery men had confi-
dence that he would respect their principles in due time."^ 6
Julian who, because of his doubts visited Lincoln at Spring-
field, said, "When Seward was defeated many an anti-slavery
man poured out his tears over the result, while deploring or
denouncing the conservatism of old UThiggery, which thus sacri-
ficed the ablest man in the party, and the real hero of its
principles. Time, however, led these men to reconsider their
estimate both of Seward and Lincoln, and convinced them that
37
the action of the convention, after all, was for the best."
While the radical elements of the party opposed and
deplored the nomination of Lincoln, the majority of them, even
the most radical, did all they could to promote his election.
For instance, Lovejoy, whom Lincoln had thot too radical to
be elected in fifty-eight, "urged the radical abolitionists
to support" him. He told them how he viewed the situation by
the use of a story. He said there wasl a man walking to Chicago
who was overtaken by a man in a wagon. They were both going
in the same direction for a short way. The man in the wagon
asked the other to ride. The man in the wagon was the Republi-
can party, the man walking was the abo li tionist. Lovejoy thot
it would be foolish not to take a "lift" even if it did not
36. Giddings, His tory of the Rebellion
,
p. 446.
37. Juliex, Polit i cal Recollect ions
,
p. 177.
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take them all the way they wished to go. Even Julian who
was extremely opposed to his nomination, said, M I zealously
39
supported him in the canvass." In short, there was a gen-
eral feeling among the radicals that while they could not get
all they wanted, they felt they could get more from supporting
Lincoln than by doing anything else.
Carl Schurz, who was also against the nomination,
delivered many speeches in favor of this election. These were
widely distributed and were characterized as "the most effect-
ive under all circumstances." 4^ "As it turned out, among
all the friends and admirers of Lincoln, none were more ardent
and eager than the German Republicans," said one who was in a
41position to know.
In fact, the canvass for Lincoln was conducted by
the ablest men in the party. "Seward acted most nobly. He
made speeches in New York, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Illinois. He even went clear to Kansas, and spoke in St. Louis
42to an immense audience."
In Pennsylvania the Republicans won largely because
of the conservative character of the candidate. The conserva-
tive character of the party was so strong in that state "that
the name Republican had to be discarded. Curtin was elected
governor (in October) as the candidate of the 'people's party'
38. LIcClean Co. Hist. Soc. Trans. Vol. 3, p. 71.
39. Ju 1 ian , Political Re collections
,
p . 181.
40. White, Life of Lyman" Yr'umbull, p. 107. Letter, H. G. McPike
to Trumbull, June 29.
41. Koerner, Hemoir s , Vol. 2, p. 101.
42. Ibid.
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and the delegates to the Chicago Convention represented only
that organization." ^ Even with this concession "in Phila-
delphia nearly the whole commercial and financial in-
terests were arrayed against Lincoln, because they regarded
the Republican party as disturbers of national tranquillity
44
and of all the interests of trade." It is interesting to
note that Blaine considered that the tariff plank in the plat-
form had much to do with the election in this state. He ad-
mits, however, that elsewhere it was often not "even mentioned.
In Indiana, the Republicans were also united under
the title of "people's party " due to the conservative charac-
ter of the men comprising the party in that state.
Giddings of Ohio declares that in his part of the
country "hundreds of thousands voted with the Republican party
under the expectation of success, caring little for the slave."
The results of the election were differently inter-
preted by the various groups in the party. The Chicago plat-
form had laid down the principle that the territories were nat-
urally free and could not become slave thru any action whatso-
ever, terri torial or Congressional. To many of the radicals, th
election with such a position was ample proof of the support of
their position. One said "the voice of the people had been
uttered in favor of equal rights, and equal justice to all men.
43. HeClure, Our Presidents
,
p. 177.
44. Ibid.
45. Elaine, Twenty Years in Congress , Vol. I, p. 207.
46. Giddings, History of the Rebel lion, p. 446.
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They had emphatically repudiated the heathenish dogma that
47
'"black men have no rights that white men are hound to respect.'"
To them their argument was very convincing. They argued that,
in as much as the exclusion of slavery from the territories put
the nation's brand on it and limited it to the states now hav-
ing it, that the platform really gave the death blow to slavery,
48if carried out. It was true that it might linger a long time,
but it would never recover. There was a general feeling thru
the South, too, that while the provision was not strongly aboli-
tion in theory, in practice and with time it would "be so. One
of the conservative Republicans says "it was well understood in
the South that it menaced the safety of slavery even where it
49
was then undisputed." The Democrats thruout the campaign had
charged the Republicans with being abolitionists. Such men as
Julian, Giddings, and others thot the charge was "by no means
50
wanting in essential truth." They were only too glad to be
so branded. Others, however, did not take it so calmly. Lincoln,
for instance, was called upon to deny the charge and did so very
vehemently. He said "Republican speakers and newspapers not only
never advocated abolition of slavery, but are constantly refuting
51the charge that they are radical abolitionists."
47. Giddings, History of the Rebellion, p. 448.
48. Julian, Poli tical Recollections, pp. 223-4.
49. McClure, Our Presidents, p. 176*.
50. Julian, Political Recollections
,
p. 224.
51. McClean Co. Hist. Soc. Trans. Vol. 3, p. 70. l0 t
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III
The Conservative Policy of the Administration
The period betvreen Lincoln's election and his in-
auguration was really one of the most critical during this
whole time. As usual, it was a sort of inter- regnum when
neither wished to do nor, for that matter, could do very much.
At first there seems to have "been on the part of some of the
Republicans, an effort to stand by their guns and to resist
any attempt at conciliation. "A dispatch to the 'Herald' (N.Y.
)
dated Washington, Dec. 4, says: 'The Republican Senators cau-
cused yesterday, and were unanimous against making any compro-
mise whatever with men or states who are in the act of violat-
ing the Constitution and the laws of their country. They
assert that they have appealed to the country upon the prin-
ciples of the Chicago platform, that the people have indorsed
them and their principles by electing Lincoln and Hamlin, in
accordance with the requirements of the Constitution.
The compromise proposition of Thurlow Weed was unequivocally
denounced as unwise, impolitic, unjust, and anti-Republican as
a whole and in all its parts. ",:L But this situation did not
last very long. Nothing positive was done and it was hard to
avoid discussion or action one way or the other.
It was a period of drifting when decided and prompt
action was needed. This drifting along, this feeling of not
1. Harper's Weekly, Dec. 15, 1860. p. 791.
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being prepared to act is undoubtedly one of the causes of the
panic which spread thru the North, often resulting in the most
abject proposals of submission to the South, on the part of
those who during the campaign had been most vociferous in the
assertion of the Republican doctrines. As one who was there in
Congress at the time has concisely put it, "the Republicans,
notwithstanding their great victory, so recoiled from the thought
of sectional strife that for the sake of peace they were ready
to forego their demand for Congressional prohibition of slavery
in the territories. They were willing to abide by the Dred Scott
decision and the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave lav;. They
even proposed a Constitutional amendment which would have made
2
slavery perpetual in the Republic." Lincoln himself authorized
3Weed to put forward such an amendment. The mere threat of
secession seemed to have paralized many Republicans at the North
who came soon to be willing to grant anything. As early as
December tenth, even Lincoln thot things were going too far, be-
cause he wrote to Trumbull at Washington, "Let there be no com-
promise on extending slavery. The dangerous ground - that
into which some of our friends have a hankering to run - is
Popular Sovereignty. Have none of it. Stand firm. "^ On
December 18th was introduced the "Crittenden Compromise, which
practically surrendered everything to slavery." "This only
2.
3.
4.
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failed in the Senate by one vote, and this failure resulted
5
from the non- voting of six rebel Senators." The "Crittenden
Compromise "was favored by many of the conservative Republicans.
The so-called "Peace Congress" v/hich contained many Republicans,
"agreed upon a series of measures covering substantially the
7
same ground as the Crittenden Compromise." Thurlow Weed,
who was later intrusted by President Lincoln with the intro-
Q
duction of three resolutions to meet the situation, favored
the measure. Mr. Seward was known to be in very close associa-
tion with him and so "was called upon to know if he indorsed the
course of Mr. Weed in the matter referred to, and Mr. Seward
replied that he knew nothing concerning Mr. Weed's views about
a compromise until he saw them in print and that he did not in-
q
dorse them." Nevertheless a Republican magazine some time
later said, "the first serious manifestation of warlike tenden-
cies at the South cooled all Mr. Seward's zeal for liberty. Tak-
ing into view his close affiliation with Mr. Weed and his subse-
quent course, there can be no reasonable doubt that Mr. Weed's
endorsement of the 'Crittenden Compromise* was really a
feeler put forward on behalf of his chief; and that Mr. Seward
would have acceded to any scheme for the joint preservation of
5. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 185.
6. From Illinois such men as Ex. Gov. J. Wood, Judge Stephen
Logan, John Palmer, C. B. Cook, and Thomas Turner were
sent to it. Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 258.
7. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 186.
8. White, Life of Lyman "Trumbull
,
p. 112.
9. Harper's Weekly, Dec. 15, I860, p. 791.
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the Union and slavery to which he could have secured the assent
of a considerable portion of his party. ,fl^
There was, however, much opposition to the acceptance
of such a measure. It was debated from December 18th to March
2nd. Senator Trumbull, who was a close associate of Lincoln,
gave a strong speech against it on the night of March 2nd. Dur-
ing this crisis he was receiving hundreds of letters from his
constituents, nearly all of which urged him to stand firm. 11
One of tliem wrote, "We want the Constitution as it is, the
Union as the Fathers framed it, and the Chicago Platform. And
we will support no man and no party that surrenders these or
any portion of them. " ^ Another wrote, "Are our Republican
friends going to concede away dignity, Constitution, Union,
laws, and justice? If they do, I am their enemy now and for-
ever. I may not have much influence, but I will tear down the
Republican party and erect another in its stead. Before I would
buy the South, by compromise and concessions, to get what is the
13people's due, I would die, rot, and be forgotten, willingly."
Even in Illinois, however, where this apparently
wide spread insistence on maintaining of Republican principles
was so evident, there were strong forces at work urging concilia-
tion. Lincoln , while he did not personally favor peace commission
ers, was compelled to acquiesce in the appointment in order to
10. The Nation, Sept. 20, 1866, p. 233.
11. White, The Li f e of Lyman Trumbul l, p. 117.
12. Ibid, p. 118. J. M. Stuftevant TPres. of 111. College,
Jacksonville) to Trumbull, Jan. 30.
13. Ibid, p. 119. W. H. Herndon to Trumbull, Feb. 9, 1861.
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be a"ble to name stanch men as delegates. It was feared that
some of the "weak-kneed "brethern would have united with the
democracy, and would have given them sufficient strength to
have passed the resolutions appointing by the General Assembly,
"
and this would have meant men more favorable to concession.
In the East this attempt to beat a retreat was most
widespread. The New York "Tribune" was the first to align it-
self against coercion and thereby earned the contempt of many
of the radicals. Julian indignantly cites a whole list of such
offenders. Among these were the New York "Herald," the Albany
"Argus," the Albany "Evening Journal," and "many other leading
organs of Republicanism." In the opinion of radicals, this
conciliatory policy of the Republican papers "necessarily gave
powerful aid and comfort to" the secession movement. Senator
Trumbull was of somewhat the same opinion, for in writing to
E. C. Lamed, who had sent him the compromise resolutions of a
Chicago meeting, he sent the following reply. "Had the Repub-
lican party from the start as one man refused to entertain or
talk compromises and concessions and given it to be understood
that the Union was to be maintained and the laws enforced at all
hazards, I do not believe secession would ever have obtained the
16
strength it now has."
Many of the radical Republicans not only did not
favor the agitation for conciliatory measures, but felt that
14. Cole, Era of the Civil War, p. 258. E. Peck to Trumbull,
Feb. 2.
15. Julian, Political Reco llections
, p. 185.
16. white, Life of Lyman Trumbull , p. 113. Trumbull to Larned,
Jan. 16.
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some positive action in the opposite direction should have been
taken. Giddings wrote in rather a plaintive tone, "the rebel-
lion had progressed thus far (Ga. , Ala. , Miss. , La. , and Fla.
,
had resigned their seats) at the close of the thirty-sixth Con-
gress, yet the Republicans of that "body made no movement, passed
17
no law, provided no means for suppressing hostilities."
In many parts of the country there was a general
feeling growing during this time, that, back of it all, the
radical Republicans and abolitionists were the real cause of
the trouble. This engendered on the part of those who were in
favor of compromise, a bitter antipathy to the radicals and
abolitionists. Their vehement rejection of the Crittenden
Compromise was not of a nature to soften this feeling. It is
said that great meetings were held in Philadelphia and New York
18
which strongly condemned the abolitionists. Many of the Re-
publican leaders were opposed to the abolitionist and radical
members of the party. This is clearly brot out in the organi-
zation of Lincoln's cabinet. Only a limited number of them
would be tolerated in it, and these because of their prominence
19
and following rather than because of their principles. As
it was, four of the members, "Messrs. Cameron, Bates, Smith,
20
and Blair were regarded as more conservative in character."
17. Giddings, History of the Rebellion
,
p. 461.
18. Julian, Political Recollectio ns, p. 185/
19. Cf. Welles, Diary , Vol. 1, pp". 81-2; Koerner, Memoirs , Vol.2,
pp. 114-9; White, Life of Lyman Trumbull, pp. 139-54.
20. Giddings, History of the Rebellion
,
p." 463.
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Only three were considered as radical. Koerner reports that
"even the day "before the inauguration a strong effort was made
to change the cabinet as regards Mr. Chase. He was present
when "some very prominent men from Ohio, Judge Carter for one,
tried to persuade Mr. Lincoln to substitute some other man
from Ohio for Mr. Chase. The entire conservative element thot
21him too radical."
Mr. Lincoln during the period between his election
and his inauguration refrained from giving any public expression
of his position on the situation. "His sentiments as declared
in his speech at the Cooper Institute, in his debates with
Judge Douglas, and in acceptance of the nomination for President
on the Chicago platform" were "referred to as embracing the prin-
22
ciples and policy of his administration."
It was generally known that Seward was to be appointed
Secretary of State. "Under these circumstances he was expected
to foreshadow the policy of the incoming President ; and great
23interest was manifest to hear him." On the 12th of January,
he spoke on President Buchanan's message. To many of the rad-
ical Republicans who had supported him zealously for the nom-
ination and who had approved his speeches in favor of Lincoln's
nomination, "which considering the state of the public feeling
in 1860, were violently radical," 24 his statements at this time
21. Koerner, Memo irs , Vol. 2, p. 116.
22. Harper's Weekly, Nov. 24, 1860. p. 743.
23. Giddings, History of the Rebellion
,
p. 459.
24. The Nation, Sept. 20, 1866". " p. 233.
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were like a slap in the face. The speech caused general despair
among those who insisted on no compromise. To them it looked
like a return to the old state of affairs where the true prin-
ciples of the Declaration of Independence were to be ignored.
"Many entertained gloomy apprehensions that they were
once more to be deceived; that the new administration would
surrender the doctrines of the party and become subservient to
the slave power. In fact the policy as given out by Mr.
Seward did not differ much from that of many Northern Democrats.
Between Lincoln's election and his inauguration there
was thus, first of all, a general movement among the conserva-
tive Republicans to conciliate the South, regardless of the con-
cessions necessary to do this. This was favored by some of the
men who had hitherto been considered radical and who had been
supported by the radicals, notably Mr. Seward. Many Republican
newspapers protested against the use of coercion. In the main
there was a radical group, especially in the Northwest, which
opposed all compromise measures. Such men came very much into
disrepute with certain Republican leaders. The policy of con-
ciliation as outlined did not differ materially from either the
old VThig position or that of the Democrats of the North.
The inauguration was looked forward to with fear and
misgiving by a great majority of the North, both Democrats and
Republicans, conservatives and radicals. Some thot it would be
too radical; others were sure it would be too conservative.
25. Giddings, History of the_ Rebell ion
,
p. 462.
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As a matter of fact, when it came it was generally well re-
ceived thruout the North. Each group looked at some part of
it and thot it saw foreshadowed there the thing it desired.
There was, however, among the radical group a feeling that it
was too conciliatory. A Southern writer states that "Mr. Lin-
coln's own party was displeased with it; and the Republican
newspapers declared that its tone was deprecatory and even
apologetic."^ To a certain extent this was true, hut it is
well to note what one of the most radical Republicans of long
standing has to say about it. Lincoln's "inaugural was just
what his friends who were best acquainted with him expected.
They understood his positions, and in public and in private
insisted that the logic of events would bring his mind to the
full appreciation of the crimes of slavery. "^ The position
of the radicals is thus shown to be one of hope for the future
rather than approval of his stand at that time. Then too, they
figuratively breathed a sigh of relief to think it was as firm
as it was. The recent widespread conservative agitation for
compromise and concessions, coupled with assaults on all aboli-
tionists and radicals, had caused them to expect something
28
worse.
By the conservative Republicans, it was well received.
They looked at the conciliatory character.
26. Pollard, The Lost Cause, p. 104.
27. Giddings, History of" the Rebellion
,
p. 463.
28. Ibid, ~ p. 462.
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"The Northern Democrats had no violent disapproval
29
to express." In fact, Douglas at several passages is re-
ported to have commented, "good, good." Nevertheless, shortly
afterward he and many other Democrats protested very vehemently
30
against it as going too far.
Between the inauguration and the attack on Fort Sum-
ter, just a little over a month, the confidence of the radicals
secured by the inaugural speech was "being slowly replaced by a
distrust of the administration. Action, prompt and decided,
was their desire. The lack of action had been one of their
chief grievances against Buchanan; and yet here, men of their
own party were carrying on the same policy. Julian draws this
scathing denunciation of this policy. "The President himself,"
he wrote, "not only still hoped, but believed, that there would
be no war; and notwithstanding all the abuse that had been
heaped upon Mr, Buchanan by the Republicans for his feeble and
vacillating course and especially his denial of the right of
the government to coerce the recusant states, the policy of the
new administration, up to the attack upon Sumter, was identical
31
with that of his predecessor."
Gustave Koerner says that "great dissatisfaction pre-
vailed, : nd the press in the Northwest was loud in its denuncia-
32tion of Lincoln and Seward." The position of the President
29. Pollard, The Lost Cause, p. 104.
30. Koerner, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 118.
31. Ju1 i an
, Political Recollections
, pp . 188-9.
32. Koerner, Memoirs
,
Vol. 2, p. 119.
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as stated in Mr. Seward's official letter to Mr. Adams dated
33April 10, 1861, drew forth considerable condemnation. This
discontent in the party was becoming rather evident even to
Southerners; one of whom said "his apparent vacillation was
producing disaffection in the Black Republican party, and the
clamor of their disappointment was plainly heard in Washington."
Even Koerner, who was a stanch supporter of Lincoln, from first
to last, admits that when news came of the firing upon Fort
Sumter, it "was almost a relief to Union men." 3 ^ They felt
that the administration could no longer delay after this and
that some decided action would necessarily have to be taken.
There was rejoicing over this fact.
But the outbreak of hostilities failed to materially
lessen the differences existing within the pa.rty. It was the
policy of the administration to make the war merely one
of saving the Union. As early as December, 1860, Lincoln had
proposed this as a rallying cry in case of hostilities. The
statements of Secretaries Seward and Smith that slavery would
in no way be affected by the war "naturally provoked criticism,
37
and angered the anti-clavery feeling of the loyal states."
Even after the battle of Bull Run, both Houses of
Congress declared that the purpose of the war was not the
33. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 189.
34. Pollard, The" To s't Cau se"," P- " 104.
35. Koerner, Memo irs , Vol. 2, p. 119.
36. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
,
pp. 112-3. Lincoln to
Trumbull, Dec. 24, 1860.
37. Julian, Political Recollections, pp. 213-4.
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"conquest" or the "subjugation" of the South, nor the overthrow
of- their "established institutions," but to "preserve the Union,"
and that "as soon as these objects are accomplished the war
ought to cease." As late as August, 1862, Lincoln wrote to
Greeley, "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the
39Union and is not either to save or destroy slavery." "To
anti-slavery men this seemed like an apology for the war, and
a most ill-timed revival of the policy of conciliation which
had been so uniformly and contemptuously spurned by the enemy. w
They maintained that to declare one of the purposes of the war
the abolition of slavery would materially strengthen the war
policy.
If it was impolitic to declare the war a crusade
against slavery there was at least no need to make it one for
preserving the institution. To them it seemed like a cold-
blooded abandonment of the rights of humanity as laid down in
the Declaration of Independence and incorporated in the Chicago
platform. It was not until very much later that the conserva-
tive elements of the party admitted that slavery was the real
41
cause of the rebellion.
From the very beginning of the administration there
was a strong effort made by Lincoln and the conservative members
38. Julian, Political Recollections
, pp. 197-8.
39. ITicolay and Hay , Complete Works, Vol. 2, p. 227.
40. Julian, Political Recollections
, pp. 197-8.
41. McPherson, History of the Rebellion, pp. 405-9. Speeches by
Wm. Dennison and Breckinridge* at the Union Con. 1864.
Also letter of acceptance by Johnson.
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of the party to attract to their support men who, while they
may have teen opposed to the preelection stand of the party,
were in favor of preserving the Union, even to the use of force.
Especially did it endeavor to attract such men in the doubtful
or "border states. In a short time, this "Border State Policy' 1
as it csne to "be called was one of the most characteristic of
the administration. It was very successful in attracting to
its support a large number of Union Democrats who later were
called War Democrats. This group included such men as Grant,
Logan, Sheridan, Dix, Sherman, Eutler, and others. Lincoln,
himself, in a letter to Schurz gave rather a clear presenta-
tion of the problem. "The plain facts as they appear to me,"
he wrote, "are these. The administration came into power,
very largely in a minority of the popular vote. The war
came. The administration could not even start in this, with-
out assistance outside of its party. It was mere nonsense to
42
suppose a minority could put down a majority in rebellion."
Altho Lincoln thus designates the outbreak of the rebellion
as the beginning of the Border State Policy, some Republicans
found traces of it farther back. Koerner, in writing to his
wife on the very day of the inauguration, foreshadows the
policy. He wrote, "We do not like the cabinet as a whole, but
Lincoln was forced into some of the appointments. The Union
men in the Border Sta tes declared to him that they must give
42. Schurz, Writings, Vol. 1, pp. 212-15. Lincoln to Schurz,
Nov. 10, 1862.
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up the fight if the cabinet was made too radical." Others
44
saw it in the inaugural address. However, it was not until
the distribution of the patronage that the policy became evi-
dent to many. The commissioning of many War Democrats for high
places in the Army was hut another illustration. The majority
of the radicals saw the most pronounced example of it in the
declared purpose of the war, in the "capture of fugitive slaves
and their return to their rebel masters by our commanding gen-
erals, "and in the "reiterated and gratuitous disavowals of
45
' abolition! sm' by prominent Republicans." The question of
the distribution of offices, while it bothered some, did not
excite the ire of the radicals nearly so much as the disregard
of the slavery question by the party. In July the President
called a special session of Congress. "The unavo idableness of
the war was now absolute, and the tone of the President's message
was far bolder and better than that of his inaugural. The policy
of tenderness towards slavery, however, still revealed itself,
4
and called forth the criticism of the more radical Republicans."
Next to the questions as to the causes and purposes
of the war, the thing which caused most discontent in the Re-
publican ranks was the prosecution of the war. From choice
or necessity, or both, the administration had placed in command
of the Federal forces men who, for the most part, had been
43. Koerner, Memo irs , Vol. 2, p. 118.
44. Pollard, The "Los t Cause
, p. 104.
45. Julian, Po li tical Recollections
,
p. 196.
46. Ibid, ~~ p. 195.
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connected v;ith the Democratic party as late as the last election.
Such men as LieClean, Sherman, Dix, Logan, Grant, and Butler
were all Democrats when they went into the Army.
The defeat at Bull Run demonstrated, to many, the
inability of these generals. The delay in moving forward when
the men seemed to he all ready, caused rampant criticism of the
methods of carrying on the war. A Congressional Committee, com-
posed of three members of the Senate and four members of the
House, was chosen on the nineteenth of December to inquire into
the conduct of the war. This "committee had its birth in the
popular demand for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, and
47less tenderness toward slavery," is the statement of one of
the members. This committee v/as severe in its criticisms both
of the prosecution of the war and of the generals who v/ere at
the head of the forces. They particularly condemned McClellan
and demanded his removal. It demanded the appointment of more
vigorous men, men who were known to be in sympathy with the
Republican party. Stanton, when he came into the cabinet, sec-
48
onded the committee m its protests. General Schurz, who
naturally favored a vigorous prosecution of the war wrote to
Lincoln that men who failed to measure up to the wishes of the
Republicans should be removed, and others appointed who would
get results. He strongly protested against keeping men in power
47. Julian, Poli tical Recollections, p. 201.
48. Welles, Diary, Vol. 1, pp." 118-19.
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for fear of offending the war Democrats, when they could "be
49
replaced "by better men.
While the prosecution of the war was considered too
lenient, when applied to rebels, there was prevalent a belief
that war conditions as laid down in the North were entirely too
severe. Lincoln soon after the outbreak of hostilities sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus. There were those of the Re-
publicans who thot the administration might better and more ad-
vantageously direct all its energies toward defeating the enemy
rather than arbitrarily arresting persons in the loyal states
and suppressing newspapers far away from the zone of hostilities.
Some were prone to question the power to do so. Some questioned
the method of doing it. Others (and there were many original
Republicans in this group, such as Hale) questioned the desira-
bility of ever suspending the writ. In Congress there was con-
siderable debate over the matter. In the Senate the debate was
long and protracted. The question first came up when Trumbull
introduced a resolution of inquiry as to what law the executive
had based the suspension on. Trumbull at this time and during
the whole war was one of the most ardent advocates of civil
liberty. Hale, Fessenden, Henderson, Trumbull, and others were
of the opinion that there was not "the slightest warrant of law
for any such proceeding. " ow Dixon, Fessenden, Browning, Wilson,
and others, however, thot the "necessity of the case" was suffi-
cient to justify suspension.
49. Schurz, Writings
,
Vol. 1, p. 216. Lincoln to Schurz.
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Those who opposed suspension wanted "to know whether
or not we are fighting for the Constitution, and for Constitu-
tional liberty "by law. 1,51 This group for the most part was
willing to make the suspension legal "but with the qualification
that men arrested in this manner should be released if not
indicted after the first meeting of the Grand Jury in their
district. A measure providing this was finally passed. But,
until it was, these men saw the danger to which unlimited sus-
pension might go. They pointed out that any Senator or Repre-
sentative might be arrested and detained for an unlimited time.
The suppression of newspapers caused even more opposi-
tion. The suppression of the Chicago Times was an occasion on
which many Republicans, such as Trumbull and Palmer, united with
the Democrats in their protest. The suppression of the New York
World and Journal of Commerce was a similar occasion in the
East. This discontent was very extensive and at times aroused
52
the whole country. At the time of the Cleveland Convention
there was nothing which received quite the attention by its
members as this usurpation of civil liberties by the adminis-
tration. In the various calls issued it is mentioned as one of
53the leading motives.
We have noticed above that there was a large group
of "come outers" or radical reformers in the party between 1856
51. Cong. Globe, Vol. 32, p. 94. Speech by Trumbull.
52. American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, pp. 389-94.
53. LIcPherson, History of the Rebell ion
, p. 410.
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and 1860, and that these men continued to "be with the party
after that date. In the light of the multiplicity of reforms
in which these men were interested, one may reasonably wonder
whether or not this period was characterized "by the enactment
of radical reform legislation. For the most part, such ques-
tions as prohibition, woman suffrage, the rights of labor, and
civil service reform were entirely ignored during the war period.
A few, such as education, land reform, and negro emancipation
did secure some attention. In case of education and land re-
form, only the bills already prepared were passed, nothing new
was done. This general ignoring of the reform measures may be
accounted for under two main reasons. In the first place, the
war loomed up as the biggest thing of the day. All the energies
of Congress were absorbed in the measures directly pertaining
to its prosecution. In the second place, a hard fight was nec-
essary to accomplish what reform they did secure.
It was necessary to urge the administration to prose-
cute the war vigorously. The radicals thot it lacked decision
in its war policy. The question of whether or not a state could
be coerced was not of as much importance to them then, as that
the war should be successfully fought. M They believed in a vigor
ous prosecution of the war, and were sick of the 'never-ending
54gabble about the sacredness of the Constitution." They felt
that if they did not direct all their efforts toward urging the
54. Julian, Political Recolle ctions, p. 215.
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administration on, the war would fall thru. This did not leave
much time for reforms. The time that was left was, for the
most part, taken up with the slavery question.
Scarcely had the Republicans been elected when, even
among the Republicans, there was agitation for the "Crittenden
Compromise." The abolitionists were bitterly opposed to any
such plan. The Chicago platform had declared that the terri-
tories were naturally free and that slavery could not be put in
them even by act of Congress. Yet this was an attempt to make
slave all the territory below 36*40". For a time at least, it
looked as if the Republicans would weaken and a hard fight was
necessary. The next proposal which they had to meet v/as the
proposed thirteenth amendment. This would have prohibited Con-
gress from ever interfering with slavery in the states. Tech-
nically this was in agreement with the Chicago platform. Lin-
55
coin himself drew up the proposal for such an amendment. But
the abolitionists looked at the spirit of the platform. To them
such an amendment "would have made slavery perpetual in the Re-
56public." The position of the radicals on this illustrates
their general position. They joined with the conservatives in
what might be considered very conservative ground but actually
they never gave up hope of gaining a more advanced position.
Where the measure blocked further action they refused to act.
55. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
, p. 112.
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Th e abolitionists had tried to have the war fought
as a war of freedom hut in this they were not successful. The
Border State Policy of the administration was a continual check
to the abolitionists. It seemed to them that too many men who
had sympathized with slavery were left in offices with control
of the patronage and that "their influence was at all times
57
exerted in favor of" slavery.
In the summer of 1862 Fremont issued a proclamation
which freed the slaves of rebels in his territory. This was
decidedly pleasing to the abolitionists and radicals, who thot
that at last things were moving their way. They saw in it the
beginning of a "new war policy" and they were thoroughly in
favor of it. Furthermore it seemed to them that "it was greeted
by the people of the Northern states with inexpressible gladness
and thanksgiving." Even such papers as the "Boston Post," the
"Detroit Free Press," the "Chicago Times," and the "New York
58
Herald" are said to have approved it. Koerner says that "it
created the widest enthusiasm on the part of the ardent Repub-
licans, particularly among the Germans" but "it was strongly
condemned by the conservative Union men in St. Louis, in the
59
State of Missouri, and in the Border States generally." Lin-
coln considered that the proclamation went farther than could
be justified under the laws of Congress and so, after Fremont
57. Giddings, History of the Rebellion
, p. 464.
58. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 198.
59. Koerner, Memo irs , Vol. 2, p. 167.
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had refused to modify his order, the President canceled it.
This was in line with Lincoln's conservative policy on the sla-
60
very question and his Border State Policy.
The results of this action were very disastrous ac-
cording to the radicals. Julian, for instance, says, "From this
revocation of the new war policy, dated pro-slavery reaction
which at once followed. It balked the popular enthusiasm which
was drawing along with it multitudes of conservative men. It
caused timid and halting men to become cowards outright. It
gave new life to slavery, and encouraged fiercer assaults upon
abolitionism. It revived and stimulated sympathy for treason
wherever it had existed." The removal of Fremont in the fall
brot the policy of the administration into further disrepute
62
with the radical press, particularly of the Northwest. Dis-
content was quite general over the whole country. It was at
this time that Greeley wrote "The Prayer of Twenty Millions .
"
In his reply the abolitionists thot the President put himself
on a level with Douglas and Buchanan by showing himself indif-
ferent to the fate of the slaves. They considered that he had
64
abandoned the humanitarian principles of the party. The pro-
tests found general a.nd wide spread expression both in Congress
and in the press and must have had some influence on Lincoln
60. Koerner, Memoirs
,
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because in September he issued his preliminary proclamation of
emancipation. Julian gives a report of a talk which he had
with Lincoln in the fall in which Lincoln said, "My Proclama-
tion was to stir the country; hut it has done about as much
harm as good." At the time it was issued, Lincoln fully ex-
pected a form of colonization to be the complement of it. If
he had known that this colonization scheme was to fail, there
65is good reason to doubt that he would have issued it.
The foregoing gives one some idea of how much effort
the radicals had to put forth in order to secure emancipation
as a war measure. For as a matter of fact, the proclamation of
the President went no farther than that of Fremont and others.
A further fight was necessary to secure real abolition of sla-
very. At that time, Lincoln thot the negroes "could never be
66
recognized or admitted to be our equals." The Republicans
as a -"party only espoused the cause of the Negro under the whip
and spur of military necessity, and not the promptings of hu-
67
manity, " is the verdict of one of the original Republicans.
This is quite different from what might have been expected,
judging the fact that it was supposed to have doomed the insti-
tution of slavery by the Chicago platform.
The land reform, as accomplished at this time, did not
meet the requirements of the old Free Soilers. It was good
65. Welles, Diary, Vol. 1, pp. 150-3.
Julian, Political Recollections
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enough in principle, but it failed to accomplish the very thing
which it aimed at homes for the homeless. This caused it
to be condemned. The method of administering the law permitted
speculators and monopolists to secure nearly all the land. Such
men as Julian and Greeley were emphatic in their denunciation
of this practice. The President's stand against the confisca-
tion of the fee of rebel landowners was considered too conserva-
tive, and it was considered to be aristocratic in its tendencies.
Altho measures to get at the fees were several times passed by
the two Houses, they never became law.
In the main, the various liberal questions which had
interested many of the reformers of the party may be said to
have been completely ignored thru this period, partly because
of the war, and partly because of the difficulty of securing
them, especially negro emancipation.
From the very start of the administration, there be-
gan to develop a general discontent with the administration.
This grew gradually into actual distrust of the members directly
connected with it. This first secured headway after the fall
of Fort Sumter. The radical Republicans first "began to distrust
Mr. Seward, who no longer seemed to them the hero of principle
they had so long idolized. He impressed his old anti-slavery
friends as a deeply disappointed man, who was in danger of being
morally lost." "Their faith was even a little shaken in Mr.
68. Julian, Political Recollections
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Chase." Sumner, altho not directly connected with the admin-
istration, came in for his share of the distrust because he
69
advocated a place on the Supreme Bench for Crittenden. In
1861, the radicals had felt very well satisfied with Mr. Lin-
coln's action in giving the first cabinet position to Seward.
By the end of Sixty- two, the discontent with and the distrust
of him had grown to such an extent that a Republican caucus
almost unanimously demanded his resignation from the cabinet.
A committee composed of the oldest and most prominent Repub-
70lican Senators was sent to Lincoln to secure the resignation.
Grimes, Sumner, and Trumbull are reported to have been "pointed,
emphatic, and unequivocal in their opposition to Mr. Seward,
whose zeal and sincerity in this conflict they doubted." Mr.
Stevens at one of the meetings of the Committee on the Conduct
of the War (April 13, 1862) "declared that not a man in the
71
cabinet was fit for his business."
This same year saw a considerable political defeat
for the party in power. The President and the radicals differed
as to the cause. The former said there were three causes - the
Republicans had gone to war and left the Democrats at home. The
military defeats caused lack of enthusiasm. The vilifying and
disparagement of the radicals gave the Democrats something to
69. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 195.
70. Welles, Diary
,
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mer, Fessenden, Harris, Trumbull, Grimes, Howard, Sumner,
Pomeroy, and Wade.
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79
work with. The radicals came "back, however, with the retort
that the defeat was "the administration's own fault. M The
"Union movement" and the lack of vigorous action, they said
were the real causes. One of these in a letter to Lincoln
frankly stated, "Many Republicans disturbed and confused
by the almost universal feeling of the necessity of a change,
either voted against you or withheld their votes. I know this
74
to "be a fact." But unfortunately the administration was not
yet "prepared to divorce itself entirely from the madness that
still enthralled the conservative element of the Republican par-
ty.«
75
During the whole period there were numerous additions
to the party. On the part of the administration and a certain
group these were welcomed with outstretched arms and everything
done to make them comfortable. From the beginning a position
on slavery had been taken which they could support if they were
not too much in sympathy with the South. The war had been de-
clared to have as its sole purpose the preservation of the Union.
The administration had declared itself indifferent as to whether
or not slavery was preserved with the Union. And there were
gratuitous disavowals of abolition on the part of many Republi-
can leaders. Democrats were given high positions in the Army
72. Schurz, Writings
,
Vol. 1, p. 212. Lincoln to Schurz, Nov. 10 , 1862
73. Ibid, p. 209. Schurz to Lincoln, Nov. 8, 1862.
74. Ibid, p. 215. Schurz to Lincoln, Nov. 20 , 1862.
7 5. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 223.
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and were soon influential in Republican councils. For instance,
Stanton, who had held a cabinet position under Buchanan, was
made Secretary of War in 1862.
The whole attitude was summed up in what is generally
called the Border State Policy. This was eminently successful
in attracting large numbers of conservative men to the party.
In fact, the followers of Bell and Breckinridge in the North
are considered to have gone over almost en masse to the Repub-
licans where some of them "have since obtained distinction, both
76for their radicalism and success in obtaining office." Repub-
lican newspapers of the time asserted that out of six major-
generals, five were Democrats and out of the hundred ten gener-
77
als eighty were Democrats. Among these were such men as Dix,
Logan, Butler, and Grant. These last three are now scarcely
ever thot of as anything but Republicans.
There was a large number attracted to the party, also,
because it was the winning one and their object was the securing
of some of the spoils. To Julian it sometimes appeared as if
the love of office alone constituted the animating principle of
78the party. Giddings considered that many such had joined the
party in the election of 1860. With the immense number of con-
tracts and the unlimited opportunities for graft during the war,
it is safe to say that the number joining for this reason is
76. Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinoi s, p. 718.
77. Koemer, Memoirs , Vol. 2, p. 206.
78. Julian, Political Reco llections
, p. 194.
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beyond estimation. They are also rather hard to locate. The
love of the Union was always a possible cause of joining the
party and the reasons stated are not easily disproved. But
"beyond a doubt, the report of the Committee on Government Con-
tracts proves that these patriotic sentiments were often lost
79
sight of "by these men. In the light of his cotton transac-
tions while in New Orleans, there may be a certain irony in
Butler's declaration that "no right-minded man could be sent
to New Orleans without returning an unconditional anti-slavery
80
man." Koerner says that "there were plenty of very warm
Union men who yet sought to make very large profits out of
8
1
their patriotism."
As early as July, 1861, the House felt it necessary
to appoint a committee to investigate the letting of government
contracts. This committee reported in December and the condi-
tions which it found were appalling. It found and reported that
there had been the most flagrant violation of the law which re-
quired that bids and proposals should be submitted for contracts.
In most cases contracts were let without asking for bids. Even
when bids were submitted, favorites were given the contracts
just the same. The only excuse offered for this was that the
public exigency required it. But what was considered worse
,
private individuals without any official connection were given
79. Cong. Globe, Vol. 32, pt. 1, pp. 710-4.
80. Pollard, The Lost Cause
, p. 257; Speech by at New York,
Jan. 8, 1863. Rho des, TTi Et . of the
TJ.S. Vol.5, p 277.
81. Koerner, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 168.
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the power to make contracts when there were already officers to
do the work. The most noted example of this was that of a Mr.
Cummings who had placed at his disposal two million dollars and
who effected for his own benefit the purchase of twenty-one
thousand dollars worth of straw hats and linen pantaloons. "When
he found he could not get a clearance for them, he generously
sold them to the government, altho the army had no use for them
whatsoever. He also placed at his private disposal one hundred
sixty thousand dollars.
The committee found that George D. Morgan, a brother-
in-law of Secretary Welles was making an annual income of a quar-
ter million dollars on the government contracts. He had already
made ninety thousand dollars when the committee reported. As a
rule these contracts were given to men who made no investment
of their own and ran no financial risk, but simply clipped a
certain profit from each contract. An example is that of Child,
Pratt, and Fox, which secured a million- do liar contract for hard-
ware and then bot from the very firm which had previously offered
to sell to the government direct, but had been turned down. This
Company did not even specify the price to be paid. Thurlow Weed
was found to have received five percent on powder contracts let
by the War Department, altho he did nothing except interview the
Secretary about the matter. 8^
These and many other cases of corruption disclosed by
82. Cong. Globe, Vol. 32, pt. 1, pp. 710-4.
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the committee called forth the condemnation of Republicans both
in the House and in the Senate. In the latter, among those most
opposed to this sort of thing was Trumbull. He stated that he
83had received much complaint from his constituents. It was
felt that the men involved in this corruption were not the men
who were originally connected with the party and that many were
those who had just come into the party and were not even always
loyal. The officers in charge of the Army had many contracts to
let. Since these were to a large extent former Democrats, the
corruption which they practiced was exceedingly distasteful to
old Republicans. For instance, the United Sta.tes Marshall for
the Southern District of Illinois wrote the following to Trum-
bull. "Large contracts for horses and mules are let without
any public notice and at extravagantly high figures, as is
charged, and men not very loyal get all the contracts. The
business ought to be taken away from them. Some member
of Van Wyck's Committee (on government contracts) ought to
come here and look into contracts. ----- Butler, Dubois, and
others are swearing most terribly at matters here." He fur-
ther asked Trumbull to see Stanton and have something done about
it.
There was still a third type attracted to the party
83. Cong. Globe, Vol. 32, pt. 1, p. 308.
84. Trumbull Correspondence, Phillips to Trumbull, March 22,1862.
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after the outbreak of the war. This was the class to whom the
business possibilities and privileges appealed. During the years
1856 - SO, the business men of the country were opposed to the
85growing strength of the Republican party. They shrank from
86
"the precipice to which mad factionists" were leading the
country. The results of the election of 1860, they considered
87
"a blight upon the market," and the announcement of the presi-
dential election in November produced a financial panic. 88 With
the inauguration and the conservative policy then announced, this
feeling gradually disappeared. The business which soon developed
89in connection with the war also did much to assuage business.
Early in the war Mr. Chase had made connections with
the bankers of Hew York. Shortly after the Battle of Bull Run,
he went to New York and met them. He made a special appeal to
them to lend the government their support. They came to the
90government's aid - at 12 percent J Another illustration of
the growing connections of business with the party, was this
fact. Thruout the war, J. P. Morgan was able to keep "the house
of Peabody and Company (in London) thoroughly informed, not only
merely about the work of the Army, but also concerning the finan-
cial condition of the country, our sources of strength, our abil-
ity to meet any taxation, and the certainty that no ruinous issues
85. Hunt's Merchant' s Magazine , 1856 - 60.
86. Ibid, Oct. 1856, p. 456.
87. Ibid, Jan. 1861, p.
88. Ibid, Feb. 1861, p. 196.
89. Ibid, Oct. 1861, p. 434.
90. Hovey, J. P. Morgan , pp. 41-2.
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91
of government bonds would ever Toe made. " Peabo dy an d C omp any
had furnished Adams with Five Million dollars in gold. This
was to enable him to stop the construction of privateers in
go
English waters. The repeal of the Gold Act of 1864 shows
the influence which business was coming to have in the party.
The system of trade permits adopted for trading with
the enemy was also a means in attracting certain interests of
the country. There was a very extensive trade with the enemy
and since their issuance was often a matter of favoritism, there
can be no doubt that they were important in securing Republican
support, especially since the authority to issue them was dele-
94gated to the subordinate officers of the departments. Welles
in writing of these permits, says, "the prize is great. Civil-
ians, quasi-military men, etc. , are interested - men o f pol itical
influence . Dix has already made three distinct visits to WaSh-
gR
ington on the subject."
According to the committee, this state of affairs
existed particularly in the Treasury Department, the War Depart-
ment and the Navy Department. It was most influential in attract-
ing to the party a number of rogues and Knaves. These continued
with the party and later forced many original Republicans to
leave it. Because these Knaves had become so well intrenched,
they could not oust them, so such men as Julian left the party.
91. Hovey, J. P. Morgan
, p. 43.
92. Ibid, p. 40.
93. Ibid, pp. 43-5.
94. Welles, Diary . Vol. 1, pp. 49 8, 536.
95. Ibid, p. 183.

-48-
IV
The Radical Disaffection of 1863 - 4
The administration "believed that the political defea
of 1862 was due to a too radical position. From then on it
inaugurated a more vigorous union movement, which finally cul-
minated in changing the name of the convention in 1664 from
Republican to Union. The "supporters of the administration,
following the lead of Mr. Lincoln himself," from then on "sys-
tematically avoided resort to the name and traditions of the
Republican party.
"
^ Coincident with this there came a de-
cided reaction against the administration which later resulted
in the Cleveland Convention. While there had been discontent
with the administration before this, it was only from sixty-
three on that it became serious and at times almost violent.
The Union movement was only one of the many causes. There was
a decided protest against the military policy, too. The New
Testament method of carrying on the war with a rifle in one
hand and an olive branch in the other was emphatically con-
demned. Uncomplimentary comparisons between Lincoln and Jack-
2
son were drawn.
The military defeats of this year did much towards
augmenting this defection. 3 The discontented elements of the
1. Dunning, Am. Hist. Rev . , Vol. 16, p. 57.
2. Cole, Era of the Civil War,, p. 314.
3. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
,
p. 211.
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party thot these were the administration's own fault. "Let us
be' commanded "by generals whose heart is in the war, and only
such," was their cry. "Let every general who does not show
4himself strong enough to command success, be disposed at once. "
They considered that a large number of officers had been kept
in charge long after their uselessness had been demonstrated,
5
"merely because their removal would offend the opposition."
They believed this was the real cause of the failures in the
field. They were frustrated in their attempt to get them re-
moved. An example of this is that of HcClellan.
With the approach of the presidential election in 1864
there arose in the minds of many the question whether or not
Lincoln should be renominated. There were those who opposed it
on principle and those who opposed it on the matter of exped-
iency. The former came from that group which had thruout the
war period considered the administration (and Lincoln as the
embodiment of it) as too vacillating and hesitating, to meet
their approval. The latter came from those who, reading the
signs of the times, thot the reelection of Lincoln impossible,
and so were willing to nominate another candidate. This group
when they saw his popular support was ready to renominate him
and promote his election.
The opposition to the nomination was "secretly cher-
ished by many of the ablest and most patriotic men in the party."
4. Schurz, Writings
,
Vol. 1, p. 210. Shurz to Lincoln , Nov. 8 , 1862
5. The Nation, Oct. 11, 1866, p. 291.
6. L'cClure, Our Pres idents, p. 183-
7. Julian, P o 1 i t i
c
al" Re "c o 1 le
c
t io ns
,
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Bpeaking
Trumbull said that it was surprising to find in^with public men
at Washington "how few, when you cone to get at their real sen-
timents, are for Mr. Lincoln's reelection." Such men as Chase,
Wade, H. W. Davis, Greeley, Sumner, Pomeroy, Julian, Stevens,
Trumbull, and many others did not favor it. It is said that of
the more earnest and thorough-going Republicans in Congress not
9
one in ten really favored it. A public meeting convened at
Washington appointed a committee which issued the "Pomeroy Cir-
cular". Pomeroy dedlared in the Senate that this embraced the
views of the National Committee on the subject. 1 This was
only one manifestation of the Chase boom. 1 "1" Lincoln's friends
soon secured evidence of this movement, 1^ and were able to create
a certain reaction thru "vigorous and counter measures."^ The
whole movement was fearfully mismanaged is the verdict of one
who was in a position to know. ^ As a result the Chase boom
fell thru.
But the opposition to the renomination did not cease.
Among the Republican newspapers which were opposed to it were
the Hew York "Tribune," the New York "Evening Post , " the "Inde-
pendent," "Brownson's Review," and many others thruout the coun-
15
try. The President's letter to Hodges in April was further
cause for complaint. The radicals declared that "it was the
8. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull, p. 218. Trumbull to H.G.
McPike, Feb. 6, 1864'T
9. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 243.
10. Republican Opinion s About Lincoln
,
1864, p. 1.
11. Welles, Diary
,
Vol. T, p. 525.
12. Ibid, p. 529.
13. Julian, Political Recollections
,
p. 237.
14. Ibid, p. 237.
LSj RemiOiiCnn QBiniQUS /.bout Lincoln. 18.&4. p.
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16duty of the President to lead, not follow public opinion."
The Cleveland Convention net on Hay 31st. By meet-
ing "before the Baltimore Convention, it was hoped to crystalize
the opposition against Lincoln before his nomination. The nom-
ination of Lincoln was a foregone conclusion and it was thot
the most effective way to meet it was to get a radical candidate
17
in the field first. But for the most part the convention
lacked practical leadership. It was composed to a large extent
of liberal and radical Germans who had become thoroughly dis-
gusted with Lincoln. This same group had given hardy support to
Fremont in 1856 and may account for his nomination at this time.
There was also a group of anti-slavery men in it, such as Wade
of Ohio, George Cheever of Hew York, William Goodell of Hew York,
18
and Wendell Phillips of Massachusetts. These men had all been
ardent advocates of abolitionism. They also had the sympathy of
19Ben Wade and H. W. Davis, and others who were not so ready to
come out with their support. The coercive power of the adminis-
20tration was said to be very great. Besides these, there were
certain Democrats such as John Cochrane and others, of Hew York
particularly. The violations of the Civil Liberties brot them
there largely.
21The "open, shameless, and unrestrained patronage"
16. Julian, Politica l Recollec tio ns
,
p. 240.
1 7
.
lieC lure
,
Our President s, pp . * 19 1 -2
.
18. LIcPherson, History of the Rebell ion
,
pp. 408 et seq.
19. White, Life of Lyman "Trumbull, p. 220.
20. Julian, Politi cal Recollections, p. 244.
21. The various call for the" Co nvention as given in McPherson,
History of the Rebellion, pp. 410-1.

of the administration, a desire for "the immediate extinction
of - slavery throughout the whole United States "by Congressional
rip
action," the endorsement of the one term principle, the
24
extension of the right of suffrage as broadly as possible,
the "belief that the rebellion could be repressed without infringe
25ing the rights of individuals or of States, to bring the peo-
ple to realize that while the best blood was being spilled on
Southern soil in the name of liberty it had really been parted
with at home, to protest against the existing dangers to
97Republican institutions^' were among the things which brot the
men together at the Cleveland Convention. Many of these things
were put in the platform and it was in advance of anything which
had been advocated by the administration.
The Cleveland Convention may be said to have had cer-
tain effects on the Baltimore Convention. Having drawn away the
most discontented element, it permitted greater unanimity in the
nomination of Lincoln. The growing feeling that the Cleveland
Convention was something to be feared may have had the result
of making the Baltimore platform more advanced. There was first
of all a gene ra1 feeling that slavery would have to go. A plank
was adopted calling for constitutional prohibition. The plat-
form also called upon the administration to prosecute the war
22. The various calls for the Convention as given in McPherson,
History of the Rebellion
, pp. 410-1.
23. Ibid, p. 410.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
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with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppression of
the rebellion." Any compromise attitude was likewise condemned.'
Only those who endorsed the principles of the platform were
considered worthy of public confidence and official trust.
Economy and rigid responsibility in the public expenditure were
30
also recommended. In the letter which the committee sent to
Lincoln informing him of his renomination, there is just a re-
flection of the opposition there had been in the party on the
31question of Civil Liberties.
During the summer the administration came to feel more
and more that it might be defeated in the coming election. Lin-
coln himself thot there was very great likelihood of this. He
made plans for cooperating v/ith the president-elect between
32
election and inauguration. With the nomination of Fremont,
he thot he would lose the German vote. They "held the balance
33
of power in Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois. M They had been
very influential in his election in 1860. By the end of the
summer it became evident that the radicals under Fremont could
not hope to win. They had not received the general support they
had looked for. The best they could do would be to throw the
election to the Democrats. This was clearly recognized and it
was thot the sensible thing to do was to unite in the support
28. Ealtimore Platform, 1864, art. 3.
29. Ibid, art. 6.
30. Ibid, art. 8.
31. LIcPherson, History of the Rebellion, p. 408.
32. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull? p. 219.
33. Koerner, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 432.

-54-
of Lincoln. By the withdrawal of Fremont, a more liberal
policy was promised and the removal of one of the most object-
35ionable members of the cabinet secured.
The radical defection was not entirely in vain. Its
significance to a student of this period lies in the fact that
there were certain groups in the Republican party which consid-
ered the administration's position so distasteful that they were
ready to break with the party. To have prompted such action,
the discontent must have been rather general and widespread.
As early as December 9, 1863, the President had out-
lined what he considered should be the reconstruction policy.
He considered that the states should be permitted to set up
governments as soon as possible. He thot the people of the
states should determine suffrage qualifications. As a private
suggestion to Gov. Hahn, he wrote that a few of "the very in-
telligent" negroes, especially those who had fought in the ranks,
36
might be given the right to vote.
The policy as outlined was far from meeting the ap-
proval of the Republican radicals. When in the first months of
1865, the administration in accordance v/ith this plan tried to
34. Schurz, Writings. Vol. 1, p. 349.
IlcPherson, History of the Rebellion
,
Fremont's letter of
withdrawal. pp. 426-7.
35. Julian, Political Recollections
, p. 248.
Koerner, Memo ire , Vol. 2, p. 433.
White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
, p. 220.
Fremont withdrew on the 21st. Lincoln asked Blair to resign
on the 23rd.
36. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull, p. 233. Letter from Lincoln,
March 13, 1864.
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secure the admission of Louisiana, Sumner objected very stren-
uously. He was supported "by Chandler and Wade. He was opposed
to admission without a suffrage provision and was able to stave
37
off the vote until the end of the session.
Opposition to Lincoln's plan of reconstruction had
"been voiced in one of the calls to the Cleveland Convention.
"A Call to the Radical Men of the Nation" urged united, action
against the administration "because of the "treachery to justice,
freedom, and genuine democratic principles in its plan of recon-
struction, whereby the honor and dignity of the nation have
been sacrificed to conciliate the still existing and arrogant
38
slave power.
In the summer of 1864 Henry Winter Davis introduced
into the House a bill incorporating some of the radical ideas
of reconstruction. It was far in advance of the position of the
administration. Nevertheless this bill passed the House and was
sent to the President for his signature. He, however, saw fit
to veto it. This still further exasperated the "earnest and
impatient Republicans" and resulted in the Wade-Davis Manifesto
39
which "fitly echoed" the feeling of the others. The issue
whether reconstruction should be by Congress or by the executive
was directly taken up in it.
It was after this widespread and very intense oppo-
sition to him by so many members of his own party, that Lincoln
37. White, Life of Lyman Trumbul l, p. 187.
38. UcPherson, History of the Rebell ion, p. 410.
39. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 246.
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inade specific preparations for cooperating with the president-
40
elect whom he was quite sure would not be himself.
Thus, we see that even at this early day, with Lincoln
himself in the presidency, there was a growing rupture in the
party over reconstruction. And it had already gravitated around
the three questions which later assumed so much importance - the
position of the seceded states, the position of the negro, in
them, and the place of Congress and the Executive in the recon-
struction.
40. ITicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 9, p. 251. The
Manifesto was published Aug. 5. Lincoln wrote out the
memorandum Aug. 23.
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V
The Succession of Andrew Johnson
With the succession of Andrew Johnson to the presi-
dency, we enter on a period of somewhat different party leader-
ship than under Lincoln. The period from 1860 to 1864 was un-
questionably dominated by the conservative elements, with, it
is true, serious, vigorous, and increasingly more frequent out-
bursts by the radicals; the period from 1865 to 1870 is char-
acterized by leadership from the radical group, the more extreme
members gaining greater influence as time goes on. Two forces
can be seen at work promoting this state of affairs. Lincoln's
dominating personality had been replaced by one whose stubborn-
ness was equaled only by his lack of diplomacy. In the second
place, the dominating factor of the war, before which all parties,
all factions, had to yield, had been removed.
The nomination of Johnson came as a big surprise to
many Republicans. Even those who were most closely connected
with the administration were surprised. 1 It was a result of
the Union movement, pointed out in chapter three. There is
evidence to show that his nomination was due largely to Lincoln
himself. "He hoped by this to bring into the Republican fold
X. Welles, Diary , Vol. 2, p. 44. As late as June 3, he wrote:
"They will be likely to renominate Hamlin."
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a large tody of Democrats who had never become Republicans , such
as' Judge Holt, General Dix, General Butler, and Governor John-
p
son." Hamlin had joined the party in 1856. His replacement
was in line with the whole Union movement of the time since
original Republicans were continually being replaced on the
party ticket by men who had supported Bell or Breckenridge in
1860.
The replacement of Hamlin by Johnson was not popular
with the radical Republicans. He had been a member of the Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War and with the other members had
urged its vigorous prosecution. This accounts for what might
otherwise seem queer. Immediately after the assassination of
Lincoln, it is said that "while everybody was shocked at his
murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the accession of
Johnson to the Presidency would prove a godsend to the country."
In the light of after events it is curious to note that the rad-
icals were decidedly pleased and confident of what his policy
would be. The members of the Committee on the Conduct of the
War called on him the day after his inauguration. One of the
members present reports that Wade said, "By the gods, there will
be no trouble now in running the government."^ It was at this
time that Johnson said that "Treason must be made infamous , and
2. LlcClure, Our Presidents
, p. 185. HcClure and Cameron of
Pennsylvania were both pledged to his support by Lincoln.
3. Julian, Political Recollections
, p. 243.
4. Ibid, ~ p. 257.
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traitors be impoverished." This satisfaction with Johnson
and trust in his agreement with them continued for a short time.
Carl Schurz,in a letter to Sumner on May 9th, wrote, "I had a
very full conversation with the President yesterday . The
objects he aims at are all that the most progressive friends
Q
of human liberty can desire." Likewise at a Republican cau-
cus on May 12th "Senators Wade and Sumner both insisted that the
President was in no danger (from the conservatives) and declared,
7furthermore, that he was in favor of negro suffrage." All this
seems illogical in the light of the intense opposition which
Johnson and his policy later met with at the hands of these
very men.
They were, however, soon disillusioned. In his proc-
lamation of May 29, Johnson definitely advocated a program which
was identical to that of Lincoln's. From then on, the friction
between him and the leaders of the party grew more and more pro-
nounced. By this time there was a large group of radicals led
by Sumner and Stevens who had advanced to the position of pro-
viding negro suffrage by Congressional action. In this they
disagreed with the administration. They were in favor of a
long period of probation, while the administration had shown
itself decided on getting the states back into the Union as soon
as possible. In December, the Senate called for the report of
5. Julian, Political Recollections
,
p. 257.
6. Schurz
,
Writings
,
Vol. 1, p. 255.
7. Julian, Political Recollection s, p. 263.
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Carl Schurz, which had "been instigated by Johnson himself, hut
which did not hear out his policy of reconstruction, and did
seem to substantiate the position of the radicals. Schurz thot
the President would suppress his report, and thru agreement with
Q
Sumner, it was arranged to be called for by the Senate. In
the light of this report, Congress passed the "Freedmen's Bur-
eau Bill." It was followed by the "Civil Rights Bill." Both
of these measures were sponsored by Trumbull of Illinois. They
were also favored by Fessenden of Maine. They were attempts to
make effective the 13th amendment which had been declared rati-
fied on December 18th, 1865. President Johnson vetoed both
measures. The "Civil Rights Bill" was then passed over the
9
veto. The real break now came between the President and Con-
gress. In the elections in the Fall, the position of Congress
was upheld. However, this was not by any means due to the fact
that the country endorsed the radical position. Johnson's per-
sonality played as large a part as anything in driving the
"essentially thoughtful and conservative element" of the party
into the arms of the radicals. There was further the question
which had cropped up under Lincoln, the question as to whether
reconstruction was primarily an executive or legislative matter.
At that time the V/ade-Davis Manifesto had declared that if the
President wishes "our support he must confine himself to his
8. Schurz, Writings
.
Vol. 1, p. 27. Sumner to Schurz, Nov. 13,
1865.
9. Cong. Globe, Vol. 36, pp. 1809, 1863.
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executive duties to obey and to execute, not make the laws,
and leave political recognition to Congress." 1^ This was
the position of many men in 1866 who, while they did not "be-
lieve in going as far as some of the radicals, did feel that it
was a matter for Congress and not for the Executive. These men
said: "Lose no opportunity of keeping the real issue "before the
country, letting the people hear constantly what it is that is
involved in the plan of reconstruction which Mr. Johnson is urg-
ing forward, what its dangers are, what the 1imi t s of his au tho r
-
ity are; and what are his true relation s to Congre ss. 11
There is noticeable in the development of the period
these four factors - a vindictive feeling on the part of some
leaders who urged the punishment of the South; a humanitarian
motive prompting some to secure the rights of the negroes; a
reaction against Johnson's personality "by those who otherwise
favored the position he took on reconstruction; and a protest
against executive usurpation. At times the membership of these
groups overlap, first one way, then another. Seldom does any
group emerge and stand out clearly on any one of these reasons.
There is a continual shifting of position among the men and the
motives actuating them during this period.
10. ITicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln , Vol. 9, p. 125.
11. The Nation, Llarch 8, 1866, p. 294.
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VI
The Forces at Work within the Party - 1865-1870
In this period there gradually emerged from the Repub-
lican leadership what may truly "be called a Liberal group. The
majority of the members of this group had, during the war per-
iod, consistently acted with the radicals. During this period
they acted at times with the radicals, at other times with the
conservatives. Toward the end of the decade they were almost
entirely alienated from the controlling group of the radical
recons tructionis ts just as they had been from the administration
in 1864, but for the opposite reason. A number of them were
later identified with the Liberal Republican Movement.
Early in the Spring of 1866, the "Nation" had urged
the people to oppose the President's plan of reconstruction.^
By September, it had already voiced a protest against the ex-
treme position to which some of the leaders were going. This
was aimed particularly at the vindictive spirit of these men.
It said, "We ought to stop at once and forever that rant
about the Southerners 'having forfeited their lives by their
rebellion' which we are sorry .to see Mr. Stevens has just been
1. The llation, Uarch 8, 1866, p. 294.
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repeating at Bedford, and which a good many people with more
2
moderation than he now and then indulge in." In the same year
Col. B. Gratz Brown, "a prominent Republican and former United
States Senator had begun agitation intended ultimately to re-
3
move all restrictions from Southerners." He had signed one
of the calls for the Cleveland Convention. It is interesting
to note in this connection that Fremont in accepting the nomina-
tion of this convention had said "In the adjustments which are
to follow peace, no considerations of vengeance can consistently
4
be admitted."
By 1867 this reaction to the radical domination had
become more emphatic. In July, under the title of "True Radical-
ism" the Nation makes this significant statement: "Many well
meaning persons are so anxious to be considered 'radical'
in their views that they fear to stop even when they have at-
tained all that is really desirable or practicable." It con-
sidered that the errors of such action were likely to create
a "reaction against wise reforms" and so it felt called upon to
give a "few words of advice to those who feel troubled by such
5fears." In August, it said "when Brown low and his loyalists
devoted themselves for two years to cursing, abusing, and 'run-
ning off the Tennesseean rebels, we could not greatly blame
2. The Nation, Sept. 13, 1866, p. 210.
3
. Hayne s , Third Parties , p . 9
.
4. UcPherson, History of the Rebellion
,
p. 414.
5. The Nation, July 18, 1867, pp. 51-2.
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them. Now however, they have a majority of voters on their
side; they have proved their ability to keep order at the polls,
and we submit that the country is fairly entitled to expect some-
thing from them in the way of pacification and conciliation."
There was a move during this year "by the radical lead-
ers to get a line on the true position of Grant. Up to this
time he had supported the administration. In 1865 he had given
a report of the conditions at the South which had supported
7Johnson's position. In November, Wade is reported to have
said that "he had tried to find out whether Grant was for Con-
gress or for Johnson, or what the devil he was for, but never
could get anything out of him, for as quick as he*d talk poli-
Q
tics, Grant would talk horse." The Philadelphia "Morning
Post" warned the radicals to keep clear of him and "to meet
silence with silence more profound. "
By 1868 the readiness with which the radicals took
up any radical and extreme measure which came along was receiv-
ing general condemnation. It was pointed out in July that the
Stevenses and Butlers, Wades and the like "had ceased to be fit
guides for the Republican party and would eventually lead it
9 /into the ditch." Even the New York "Tribune" , which had up to
this time supported them, was forced to repudiate them. Its
6. The ITation, August 8, 1867, p. 110.
7. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
, p. 252.
8. The Nation, Nov. 14, 1867, quoted from the "Commercial, "p. 386.
9. Ibid, July 23, 1868, p. 62.
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comments on Thaddeus Stevens in July were said to have "been a
model of "plain dealing."^ The chief reaction to these lead-
ers cane in connection with the impeachment of Johnson. This
will be considered later.
The years between 1865 and 1870 saw on the part of
certain liberal groups a disposition to stop and consider just
where they should be, just what position it was logical for
them to take. There was a growing tendency to criticise the
management of the party, to make it conform more nearly to what
they would have it. This of course was severely condemned by
those in control who continued to protest that rebels would gain
control if the whole party ticket was not elected and that the
Union would again be in danger. In commenting on this practice
a Republican Journal wrote, "people who preach morality at this
period (before elections) are generally pronounced by 'practical
politicians' either fools or traitors, and are urged, as we have
been our selves, to stop sermonizing till the election is over.
In spite of this danger there was a disposition on the part of
some of the members to criticise. The elections of 1867 in which
the Republican party was estimated to have lost 107,000 of the
majority which it had had the year before, shows that this was
true. It was thot that about 160,000 Republicans who had voted
the year before, simply stayed home; since they could not vote
10. The Ilation, July 23, 1868, p. 62.
11. Ibid.
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either ticket they refused to vote at all. Some of the lead-
ing newspapers, the Hew York "Tribune" among them, frankly ad-
13
vised the voters not only to "scratch" hut to"holt.
"
Of more importance and of greater significance during
these years was the feeling on the part of some, that the Repub-
lican party had actually changed its character. Not only had
it changed its policies and principles to a large extent, hut
even the men now dominating it were not true Republicans. During
the war period these changes had occurred, but the men involved
in the events of that day could give very little attention to
the matter. All their energies were directed to the prosecution
of the war. It was only after the war that there was a. sort of
breathing space in which to consider just where events had led
them. As early as 1865 there was a start in this direction. It
was noticed at that time that "the party of the administration
is composed of men as different as the late Edward Everett, Gen-
eral Butler, John A.Griswold, Thurlow Weed, and Charles Sumner,
who were respectively leaders of the Bell-Everett, the Brecken-
ridge, the Douglas parties and both wings of the Republican par-
14
ty. " There was also developed at this time an appreciation
of the situation as it had been during the war. The Republican
party "drove its leaders before it through the war, not wanting
to be led by any man" was the judgment in 1866.
12.
13.
14.
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Th ere was an attempt in 1867 to define definitely the
principles which had "been instrumental in the formation of the
party and to advocate them as the principles then. "It is not
the party of 'equal suffrage' or of any other political pill
or tonic" it was declared. "It is the party of good government,
15
of virtue, knowledge, and understanding." At the same time,
it was said that there were strong indications that the men of
influence were finding out to what the trouble in the party was
due. On consideration it was concluded that the defeats of 1867
were caused "by the "apathy or temporary disgust of Republicans"
and that it was possible by continuing the prevailing tactics,
to drive into the opposite ranks those who had simply stayed
home that year.
In 1868 came the real recognition that the leaders
prominent in the party were not the same as those in its early
history, that many of the men who had been identified with the
party were entirely out of it or else discredited with it. This
recognition led to considerable animosity toward the leaders
then prominent in the party. For instance, the "Nation" in
speaking of Wade about this time, calls him "the old war horse."
A week later it speaks of Stevens and Butler as "two demagogues'.'
In July it referred to Mr. Logan and Mr. Butler as "Those two
19good old Democrats." It summed up the growing opinion among
15. The Nation, Oct. 31, 1867, p. 355.
16. Ibid, Oct. 17, 1867, p. 315.
17. Ibid, May 21, 1868, p. 403.
18. Ibid, May 28, 1868, p. 427.
19. Ibid, July 9, 1868, p. 21.
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the Liberal Republican leaders in the following paragraph. "Since
the outbreak of the war the Republican party has been joined by
a large number of recruits who have no mental or moral affinity
with the party, who are not men of conscience or of ideas, and
who belong to it because it is the winning party, and because it
has been the national party, but who have no sympathy with re-
forming and progressive tendencies, and who have no idea of lead-
ing it on any but the old democratic principle of 'open your
20
mouth and shut your eyes I" The opinion was further expressed
that "some of the recruits which the Republican party enlisted
during the war will kill it before long, if it does not manage
21
to give them a discharge." It was felt that too much import-
ance had been given to such men as Butler, Logan, and Cobb, while
men like Trumbull, Fessenden, Dixon, Norton, Dcolittle, and
Grimes were becoming discredited, altho they had been among the
early Republican leaders. Three of them had felt they could no
longer act with the party and had gone over to the Democrats.
The policy of utility or expediency which had come to
be one of the primary characteristics of the Republican party
by this time also came in for its share of criticism. The party
was in the main dominated by moral ideas, but it was maintained
that the leaders failed to appreciate this fact. This was fruit-
ful of much agitation for a return to the original principles of
the party. This protest against the policy of expediency had
20. The Nation, July 2, 1868, p. 5.
21. Ibid, p. 1.
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been one of the principles -.vhich Republican leaders had urged be-
fore they came into power. Speaking of the situation in 1866
one Republican leader who had been prominent in the party from
the start said, "Great and far-reaching, interests were at stake,
but they were made the sport of politicians, and disposed of in
the light of their supposed effect upon the ascendency of the
Republican party. Statesmanship was sacrificed to party manage-
23
ment." By 186? it was demanded that these policies be thrown
overboard and a return made to the original principles of tne
party. "It must, in order to do its duty" it was said, "discard
at once the idea that it may or must use the same means that the
Democratic party has been in the habit of using. It must
24
abandon the Democratic plan of throwing dust in the peoples' eyes,"
and many other of the abnoxious habits it had become accustomed
to use. "If the respectable portion of the party does not speak
out strongly and speedily, there will be a disaster sooner or
later, and throwing the blame on the weak-kneed will not mend
25
matters" was the prevailing opinion of this group.
The most violent denunciation came over the corrupt
practices which had crept into the party during the war when the
large number of contracts at the government's disposal attracted
all the knaves and rogues in the North to its support. When the
war was over this same state of affairs continued. The lioeral
22. cf. Schurz, Wri tings , Vol. 1, p. 65.
23. Julian, Political Recoll ections
,
p. 306.
24. The Nation, Oct. 31, 1867.
25. Ibid, July 2, 1868.
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elements of the party, when they realized tne situation, were for
cleaning house. In 1865 a personal dispute between Greeley and
Weed was the occasion for airing the extent to which such prac-
tices had gone. Greeley in one of his articles speaks of "that
shameful, pernicious, systematic traffic in legislation, fran-
chises, grants and immunities whereby Thurlow Weed has become
rich and infamous." "This is perfectly plain speaking" is the
26
comment made on the article by one magazine.
In 1867 there was still further realization of the con-
dition and demands for reform. "In California the Repuolican party
has suffered itself to be led by notorious knaves, who wnile wav-
ing their hats for Congress and the black man with one hand, had
the other thrust up to the elbow in the 3tate treasury" is the
verdict of a magazine which consistently supported the Republican
27party. *"
In 1868 it was declared that "for years, no knave, how-
ever notorious, has ever been put up for election that the party
editors have not come forward and assured their readers on the
word of a patriot, that if he was not elected the country would
be ruined; that the enemy was at the gate3, and had to be defeated,
28
before the work of purification could be begun." Now was the
time to secure these changes, was the opinion of the liberals.
For it was said "there is in the ranks of the Republican party
26.
27.
28.
The Nation, Aug. 31, 1865, p. 265.
Ibid, Oct. 19, 1867, p. 232.
Ibid, July 2, 1863, p. 5.
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a vast body of persons to whom the condition of the public ser-
vice and the growing power of money in both politics and law,
39
are matters cf serious ooncern."
It was a big question as to what men who desired re-
form should do. To continue to vote the Republican ticket would
not improve matters; while to vote the Democratic ticket was
felt to be even worse. "It is alleged that the Republican party,
as an organization, has become as corrupt as the Democratic;
that its managers are lobbyists and its chosen legislators venal;
that Republican revenue officers defraud the treasury of millions
and a Republican Senate keeps them in office, while a Republican
House of Representatives kills every proposition for reform in
the civil service." "And in' substance the Republican party must
plead guilty to these charges," was the decision of one of the
30
party.
To summarize, during the period between sixty-five and
seventy, there was a growing reaction to the extreme radical
position by certain groups which might truly be called liberal.
There was also on the part of this element a tendency to stop
and consider their position, to see ju6t where they stood in re-
lation to affairs. In the main, they decided that the party had
during the war undergone considerable change, and that the party
of 1S68 was not the party of 1856-60, either as to policies and
£9. The Nation, July 16, 1868, p. 46.
30. Ibid, July 30, 1868, p. 84.
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principles or as to the men dominating it. When this was realised
there was agitation for a return to the principles which had ac-
tuated the party in its early days. The first step in this direc-
tion they felt was the abolition of the corrupt practices which
had become one of the chief characteristics of the party.
As has been pointed out in chapter four, the reform
element in the party had during the war period been forced to
direct all its energies to prosecuting the war and securing a
suitable settlement of the negro question. After 1865, both of
these engrossing subjects were removed, the one entirely, the
other partially. It was then thot proper that the other great
questions which had been in "abeyance during this great struggle"
should be taken up and brot to the attention of the public for
proper settlement. As early as the summer of sixty-five there
was a feeling that the negro question had absorbed the attention
long enough. "Everybody" it was declared, "is heartily tired of
32
discussing his condition and his rights." The idea was grow-
ing that other matters should now receive consideration.
One of the first questions to be taken up was that of
the tariff. As has been pointed out in chapter 2, the so-called
protective plank in the Chicago platform of I860 was worded in
such a way as to secure both those who did and those who did not
favor protection. There were certain groups in the East which
31. The Nation, July 18, 18S7, p. 51.
32. Ibid, July 6, 1865, p. 1.
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33
it was necessary to placate with such a plank. But there was
a large group in the party which was not only not in favor of
protection but frankly desired a tariff for revenue only. For
the sake of unity they had yielded the point in 1860. During
the war duties were carried to such an extreme that many of
these were for abandoning the principle altogether now. The men
from the Northwest took this ground earlier because there, the
effects of the tariff were most felt. As early as 1865 it was
generally recognized that there was "the utmost radical differ-
34
ence" upon the tariff question among the Republican leaders.
It was thot at that time that "the fundamental problem of pro-
tection and free trade" would be one of the things on which par-
35
ties would be formed.
The high duties had become associated in the public
mind with the maintenance of the public credit. But the high
handed and sordid way in which tariff legislation was carried
thru Congress became more and more a matter of grave concern and
it was prophesied that it would before long be the cause of "a
36
violent reaction against the whole protective system." It was
becoming evident by 1866 that "the real work of drawing" up such
legislation "was done in the lobby, and consisted in an
elaborate effort to appease the various 'interests' whose agents
and deputies besieged the committee room, and cajoled, or threat-
37
ened, or seduced the members."
33. Blaine, Twenty Year 3 in Congress, Vol. 1, pp. 203-14
34. Harper's Weekly, Feb. 25, 1865.
35. Ibid.
36. The Nation, July 5, 1856 „ r>. 1C.
37. Ibid.
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In this same year the group collecting around B. Gratz
Brown in Missouri declared for a revenue tariff. In Illinois
there was al30 a growing desire that the protective principle
should be abandoned as "mischievous." In this State such Re-
publican leaders as Ray, Medill, White, Lamed, and others formed
a league to keep Congress from running the protection theory into
38
the ground.
By 18S8 the opposition had assumed great dimensions.
In this year was organized the "American Freetrade Leaguer whose
members were in favor of only a protective tariff. Many of these
men were among those who were prominent in the Republican party.
They were such men as Field and Tilden, who had been old Free
Soilers, Wm. C. Bryant, Wm. L« Garrison, Horace White, and Carl
39
Schurz. In fact, the opposition was so strong this year that
the Republican Convention did net put a tariff plank in its plat-
40
form. But thi3 did not alter the situation very much and the
tariff question was one of the forces back of the Liberal Repub-
lican movement in 1872-
There was a general renewal of the questions which had
interested the members before the war. The rights of labor, land
reform, woman suffrage, and civil service reform were some of those
receiving attention. But the dominating group was hostile to such
measures and they failed to become party measures. One of the
most frequent complaints of such men as Julian was that the party
refused to advance enough to take up these problems.
38. Cole, Era of the Civil War
, pp. 409-10. Ray to Trumbull,
Jan. 15, 1866.
39. Kaynes, Third Parties, p. 12.
40^Jrocecdjnrg of thc~"lla t
' 1 . TJnlon 2cp. Con. 1868
.
pp. 04-5.
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Curious as it may sound, the impeachment of Andrew
Johnson brot about by the extreme radicals, was the rock on whioh
the various elements of the party split. From that time on, while
the liberal group still continued to vote with the radicals on
various measures, a division can be definitely traced. To them
the situation at the impeachment verified the conclusion at which
they had been gradually arriving as to the true character of the
party.
In the summer of 1S67 the President saw fit to remove
Stanton and Grant took his place. It was over this question tnat
the President was finally impeached. The President's personality
and stubbornness played into the hands of the radicals. On Feb-
ruary 34th the House, which had rejected the recommendation of
the Judiciary Committee in December, now by a vote of 1S8 to 47
adopted the same resolutions. At this time every Republican mem-
41
ber present voted in the aff irmative. Articles of impeachment
were prepared and the trial began on March 5th.
While at first the country had flared up over what it
considered an act of executive usurpation, "the impeach era lost
ground in the estimation of the sober-minded and reflective
classes by their intemperate language, by their efforts to bring
42
outside pressure to bear upon Senators." It became more and
more evident that the impeachment had been purely a party matter.
When the articles came up for voting, seven Republican
senators voted against the eleventh article which was the first
41. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
,
p. 309.
42. Ibid, p. 312.
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one voted on. They were Henderson, Trumbull, Fessenden, Grimes,
Ross, Fowler, and Van Winkle. Besides these there were twelve
Senators who had formerly been with the Republican party but who
had gone over to the Democrats before this. They included such
43
men as Doolittle, Dixon, and Norton. The utmost pressure was
brot to bear on some of the seven to change their vote, but it
was not effective. In fact, if it had been necessary, there were
44
other Senators ready to vote against impeachment.
The immediate effect of the action of the "seven trai-
tors" was to cause them to be ostracized by the radicals who now
dominated the party. The New York "Tribune" contained a flagrant
attack on Grimes, Trumbull, and Fessenden. Charles Spencer said
he would advise Trumbull not to appear at the Chicago Convention
45for fear he would be lynched. Later a committee was appointed
in the House to investigate the corruption of these Senators.
Butler was particularly active in this matter.
But the violent treatment of Senators acting in a judi-
cial character soon brot about a reaction. Papers which had
favored the impeachment did not approve of these arbitrary meas-
ures. Among these were the "Nation." On May 21st it contained
the following: "The torrent of vituperation against Messrs. Trum-
bull, Fessenden, and Grimes has ceased, owing to the indignation
it has excited throughout the country, and the certainty it re-
vealed that if they were driven out of the party they would take
43. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull , p. 312.
Tribune Almanac, 1838, p. 33.
44. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull
,
p. 321. Morgan, Sprague, and
Willey pledged themselves to vote in the negative if needed.
45. Ibid, p. 315.
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with them nearly everybody and everything that keeps it alive.
In fact, if they and their friends were gone, the party would
46
perish incontinently."
That the impeachment was not only a party matter, but
that it had its personal side was also being seen. "It was gen-
erally believed" by the radicals "that Johnson would be success-
fully impeached; that Wade would become President for the remain-
der of the term, with illimitable patronage, and that his nomina-
tion for the Vice-Presidency was apparently assured." When the
47
acquittal came "that ended Wade's candidacy." In July it was
thot that "the mischief which Mr. Johnson, if successful, could
bring upon the country would be less than that which might have
been caused in the eight months of Mr. Wade's incumbancy, by a
general subversion and expulsion of office holders such as we
48know to have been planned with all minuteness .
"
The nomination of Grant by the Republican Convention
of 1868 was a matter of expediency. He was the only candidate
whom it was thot could secure the cooperation of all the groups.
This was not because of any principles which he advocated or any
stand he took on the questions of the day, but because of his
military record. He had been considered a possibility by the
Democrats, and this would have been a much more logical place for
him since he never voted a Republican ticket until after he had
49been a Republican President for eight years.
46. The Nation, May 21, 1868, p. 402.
47. McClure, Our Presidents
, pp. 210-11.
48. The Nation, July 30, 1868, p. 83.
49. McClure, Our Presidents
,
p. 202.
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In the Republican platform of this year there was a
plank calling for "radical reform" of the corruption which ex-
isted then in the party and for strict economy in the adminis-
50
tration of the government. The liberal elements in the party
felt this would be a test of whether or not the party intended
to reform. But something more than mere words was demanded.
Mr. Jenckes had introduced a civil service bill which it was
generally conceded would accomplish much reform. "As soon as
we see any Republican leaders openly advocating it, as they have
advocated the reconstruction acts we shall believe in the
sincerity of their desire for reform, but not till then" was the
liberal position.^1
But the reform elements were disappointed. The same
policy was carried on, the old methods continued to be used. By
1870 they were convinced that a change was necessary. Julian
in that year advocated what he called the "New Departure." This
included a radical reform of the tariff and land policy, the
emancipation of the party from the rule of great corporations
and monopolies, an adequate reform of the civil service, and the
52
adoption of the one-term principle. It became increasingly
clear during these years that the party refused to move forward
and take up "the living questions of the times." The intolerance
of the leaders which became marked at the time of the impeachment
trial became unbearable, until finally there was a concerted
50. Chicago Platform, 1868, art. 7.
51. The Nation, July 16, 1868, p. 47.
52. Julian, Political Recollections
,
p. 333.
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action on the part of a large group which resulted in the Liberal
Republican movement. By 1870 the Republicans in Missouri were
definitely divided into two factions known as the Liberal and the
53
Radical.
The Republican Party had by this time been in power ten
years; it was to continue in power for fifteen years longer. Yet,
during the first decade, it has been shown that the party had
undergone the most drastic changes. At the beginning of the per-
iod, the party was characterized by a large element of the most
radical reformers, actuated by humanitarian motives. It came out
of the decade with only one of the questions settled (that of
slavery) and refused to take up the questions at hand, such as
woman suffrage, the rights of labor, and civil service reform.
In its early history, it had been dominated by men who were in-
terested in all these questions. After the first decade these
reformers found no place in the party. When it came into power,
it created a panic in the business world. During ten years of
power, it had succeeded in attracting to its support a number of
the business interests of the country by it3 preferential legis-
lation. The wholesale jobbing in legislation and the growing im-
portance of the lobby caused such founders of the party, as Seward,
Julian, Schurz, Sumner, Greeley, and Trumbull to leave the party
in order to retain their self-respect.
Under Grant such men as Morton of Indiana, Conkling of
53. Haynes, Third Parties
,
p. 9.
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Kew York, Cameron cf Pennsylvania, and Butler of Massachusetts
were the autocrats of their respective States. Yet what had been
the history of these men? Morton at the time of Lincoln's elec-
tion had headed a party tfhioh refused to use the very name Re-
publican. Conkling, altho in Congress for some time, is said
never to have linked his name with any important policy or prin-
ciple. Butler had been a Breckenridge man in 1860. While serv-
ing with the Army in New Orleans, he is generally credited with
having made a fortune thru speculation in rebel cotton. Cameron
had been forced to resign from Lincoln's cabinet because of the
contract frauds in his department.
By 1872 desertion by the original members became very
widespread. This included all the most prominent leaders. In
Illinois alone there were ten such leaders who had been intimate-
ly connected with Lincoln. But the Liberal Republican movement
was not successful and the years following 1873 saw a scattering
of the elements which had been active in it. A surprisingly
large number, such as Koerner and Trumbull, definitely went over
to the Democrats; others, such as Sohurz and Adams, went back
to the Republican ranks. Regardless of which way these men went,
however, they continued to agitate for reform and an advanced
position on the questions then before the public.
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